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ABSTRACT 
 Since the early 1990s, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has 
increasingly welcomed the participation of non-member states in its operations and 
activities. This thesis examines two NATO maritime operations: Operation Active 
Endeavour (OAE), conducted from 2001 to 2016, and Operation Ocean Shield (OOS), 
conducted from 2009 to 2016. In each of these operations, NATO benefited from the 
participation of non-members, notably in information sharing. OAE and OOS provided 
opportunities for non-members to gain valuable insight into how NATO and its Allies 
operate individually and together in multilateral missions.  NATO and its partners 
thereby gained the potential for more extensive and higher-quality participation in the 
future. Moreover, NATO obtained an outside perspective on its operations and practical 
support in the allocation of responsibilities undertaken by NATO Allies and non-NATO 
partners.  The participation of non-NATO partners benefited both the Alliance and the 
non-member operational partners. 
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In September 2001, following the terrorist attacks in the United States, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), one 
of the Alliance’s several responses to counter-terrorism. Shortly after OAE’s creation, 
NATO accepted assistance from countries that were not part of the Alliance, although the 
Alliance had done this with comparatively few operations in the past and those cases 
involved ground forces in the Balkans. In August 2009, in response to a United Nations 
(UN) call to curb piracy and protect aid efforts in Somalia, NATO began Operation Ocean 
Shield. Unlike OAE, OOS included non-member participation from its start. Both 
operations represented a shift in NATO policy toward the inclusion of non-members. 
However, did the addition of these countries provide a benefit to the operation or NATO?  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
What impact has the participation of non-member states had on maritime operations 
conducted by NATO since September 2001? The goal of the two major NATO maritime 
operations that were conducted since the September 2001 attacks in the United States was 
to help curb terrorism as well as piracy. Other recent operations in the area, including 
Italy’s Mare Nostrum, have pursued similar goals of fighting terrorism and aiding war torn 
neighbors while assisting endangered migrants. This thesis analyzes NATO’s OAE and 
OOS separately and evaluates the lessons learned for future operations. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Despite the efforts of the United States, its allies, and security partners to curb 
terrorism and piracy, both remain a danger to most of the globe. NATO has played a major 
role in counter-terror and counter-piracy operations in the Mediterranean and the Indian 
Ocean. Contributions to these NATO-led operations by non-NATO states reinforced OAE 
and OOS for 15 years (2001-2016) and 7 years (2009-2016), respectively. This building 
upon success may signify a trend in NATO to include more non-member states.  
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The first maritime example of non-member participation was OAE, through which 
NATO paved the way for the cooperation of maritime forces in an international framework 
by creating partnerships with non-NATO countries. This is due in part to the possible 
global impact of terrorism and the possibility of its spread. As a result, NATO was able to 
draw on the support of not only of its members but also of other countries that have an 
interest in countering these threats.  
The second example, OOS, followed a similar pattern. Although initially 
established as a NATO operation, it too increased its capacity by allowing non-members 
to participate because of the global concern over piracy in the region and the possibility 
that it too could spread. In the OOS case, NATO acted at an even earlier point in the process 
to welcome non-member support in the operation.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Three major categories of literature exist for each operation, OAE and OOS. The 
first consists of the information published by NATO concerning the specifics of the 
operations—their dates, participants, and accomplishments—to describe the origins and 
transformations of each operation. The second category features NATO Defense College 
papers that analyze the operations. The third category contains scholarly works from 
outside NATO. Most of these works focus on the contributions of a single country to a 
NATO operation and provide an in-depth analysis of that participation.  
An extensive analysis of the literature mentioning OAE and OOS typically notes 
the origins and sometimes provides statistics about the operations or information on the 
participants. The scholarly works generally focus on one or two of the main participating 
countries at the time; however, there is a lack of works that cover the other countries that 
participated. For OAE, the research focuses on the improving ties between NATO and 
Russia but fails to analyze the contributions by Georgia, Israel, Morocco, New Zealand, 
and Ukraine. For OOS, the published research focuses on the inclusion of forces from 
Japan as well as NATO developing ties to China but fails to analyze the contributions by 
Australia, Colombia, New Zealand, and Ukraine.  
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One of the most helpful starting points for basic information on OAE was NATO’s 
website. It offers information on the purposes and participants, but does little more than 
list the information with little to no analysis. OAE was one of NATO’s responses to the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. Its primary objective was to 
prevent terrorist activity in the Mediterranean, and as such, it fell under the NATO Joint 
Force Command located in Naples, Italy.1 The Mediterranean is a critical area to protect 
due to the extensive flow of merchant traffic through its narrow seas.2 In order to monitor 
maritime movements and deter terrorism in the Mediterranean, OAE relied on the vast 
number of merchant vessels in the area to report suspicious activities and employed naval 
assets for conducting presence and surveillance missions. The operation specifically 
targeted the movements of weapons associated with terrorism.  
The NATO Defense College, the second source of information advantageous for 
this thesis, provides analysis and research from NATO’s perspective. Two schools of 
thought have come out of this research. The first, described by Claudia Bernasconi, is that 
OAE succeeded because it involved cooperation with partners outside the NATO 
framework. This first school of thought holds that future operations should continue to 
welcome the contributions of non-members.3 The second school of thought, described by 
Pierre Razoux, contends that the inclusion of non-member states through multiple 
frameworks has been taxing and difficult because of the “different contents and format, 
which does not facilitate coordination.” As a result, this school’s view on cooperation is 
cautious at best.4  
The third category of literature for OAE comprises the scholarly articles, which 
have generally served two purposes.5 The first was to discuss the increase in NATO-Russia 
                                                 
1 “Operation Active Endeavour,” NATO, October 27, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_7932.htm. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Claudia Bernasconi, “NATO’s Fight Against Terrorism: Where Do We Stand?,” NATO Research 
Paper 66 (April 2011): X.  
4 Pierre Razoux, “The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue at a Crossroads,” NATO Research Paper 35 
(April 2008): 2. 
5 These articles are listed in the List of References. 
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cooperation in the post-Cold War era and even more so in the post-September 2001 era. 
The second purpose was to examine the origins of OAE and to discuss its success as a 
result of outside partners—specifically, those in the Mediterranean Dialogue, the 
Partnership for Peace, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. However, these articles fail 
to offer information regarding the inclusion of Georgia, Israel, Morocco, New Zealand, 
and Ukraine in OAE. According to Isaac Kfir, OAE “provides a good example of how an 
operation can evolve from a traditional security operation to a mechanism that provides 
protection and as a tool to improve relations between the NATO members and the other 
countries, emphasizing once again, NATO’s commitment to develop and build 
partnerships.”6 The success of OAE’s inclusion of non-members resulted in their inclusion 
in future maritime operations.  
Like the information for OAE, one of the most useful sources for basic information 
on OOS was NATO’s website. As with OAE, however, the website does little more than 
list the information with minimal analysis. OOS was a NATO operation for seven years 
(2009-2016). It was established to counter and deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off the 
Horn of Africa, and in the Indian Ocean.7 In contrast with OAE, which involved only 
NATO allies at the beginning, OOS was “designed to not only promote naval security but 
also forge ties with out-of-area states such as New Zealand, Australia and Japan.”8 NATO 
partnered with the European Union (EU) and the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces in 
Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings, allowing the organizations along 
with 30 states operating in the area to coordinate their efforts. Notable countries involved 
in these meetings were China, India, Japan, and Russia.9 This inclusion indicates NATO 
                                                 
6 Isaac Kfir, “NATO’s Paradigm Shift: Searching for a Traditional Security-Human Security Nexus,” 
Contemporary Security Policy 36, no. 2 (July 8, 2015): 235, https://doi.org/10.1080/
13523260.2015.1061766. 
7 “Counter-Piracy Operations (Archived),” NATO, December 19, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/topics_48815.htm. 
8 Kfir, “NATO’s Paradigm Shift,” 235. 
9 James M. Bridger, “Safe Seas at What Price? The Costs, Benefits and Future of NATO’s Operation 
Ocean Shield,” NATO Research Paper 95 (2013): 6. 
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allies decided to build upon their success with OAE by making OOS a “capacity-building 
programme” and including states such as Australia, New Zealand, and Ukraine.10  
The NATO Defense College, once again the second source of information useful 
for this thesis, provides analysis and research from NATO’s perspective. However, only 
one study of OOS has been published by the NATO Defense College, and it concluded that 
OOS has achieved “an unparalleled level of international cooperation.”11 This indicates 
that NATO’s decision to continue its trend of including non-members in operations was 
positive and fruitful.  
The third category of literature for OOS consists of scholarly articles, which have 
had two main purposes. The first has been to provide general information on the origins, 
participants, and mission accomplishments. The second purpose has been to clarify the 
level of integration and success of particular states or international organizations acting in 
cooperation with NATO, particularly Japan, China, and the United Nations (UN).  
Japan’s contributions in particular benefitted the operation. Alessio Patalano notes 
that “both actors [Japan and NATO] need to face the possibility of having to deter both 
Russia and China from taking steps against the established maritime order.”12 Therefore, 
Japan’s contributions not only benefited the operation, but also signified a trend toward 
improved cooperation with Japanese forces for the possibility of joint action to deal with 
future security challenges.  
NATO’s move toward including non-members in its operations has been clearly 
evident in these two maritime operations. OAE did not initially involve partners, but their 
inclusion in the later phases of activity benefitted the operation. Building on this success, 
OOS welcomed the contributions of partners from an early phase, and succeeded in 
reducing piracy. NATO crisis management in the future will likely continue this trend and 
not only include but rely on non-member participation.  
                                                 
10 Kfir, “NATO’s Paradigm Shift,” 236. 
11 Bridger, “Safe Seas at What Price?,” 6. 
12 Alessio Patalano, “‘Natural Partners’ in Challenging Waters?,” The RUSI Journal 161, no. 3 (June 
22, 2016): 44, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1193356. 
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In addition to reducing terrorist activity through the Mediterranean, OAE 
succeeded in geopolitical relationship-building between NATO members and non-NATO 
countries and organizations. This thesis examines to what extent OAE enhanced 
intelligence sharing and co-operation with countries willing to provide assistance. Doing 
so may have enabled these countries to sever links in the networks of terrorists and 
traffickers and provided assistance to countries in need with the forces at their disposal.  
Similarly, this thesis assesses the hypothesis that in addition to reducing piracy 
activity in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, OOS (following the example of OAE) 
succeeded in geopolitical relationship-building between NATO members and non-NATO 
countries and organizations. This thesis investigates to what extent the inclusion of non-
members in OOS was advantageous for mission accomplishment.  
There are two extreme possibilities about the effectiveness of including non-
members in NATO’s maritime operations. The first possibility is that it was a resounding 
success in that non-members were able to integrate fully, and their support was vital to the 
success of the operation. The second is that the inclusion of non-members was detrimental 
to the operation and that it floundered as a result. Intermediate possibilities are also 
conceivable. For example, the participation of non-members might have been of minimal 
importance with little effect on the success or failure of the operation. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research for this thesis utilized three main sources of information. The first 
focused on NATO’s website for specifics on operation origins, activities, transitions, and 
participants. The second included NATO Defense College studies for analyses from within 
NATO. The final source comprised scholarly works which typically focused on the 
involvement of a single country in an operation. This thesis focuses in particular on the 
participation of countries outside NATO.  
This thesis explores the success of both OAE and then OOS by considering the 
roles of the individual participants. To do this, it examines the origin of each operation. 
Second, it evaluates the transformations throughout each operation’s duration. Finally, this 
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thesis introduces the participants, specifying the part that each played, and investigates to 
what extent their inclusion led to each operation’s success.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized in five chapters. Following Chapter I, Chapter II focuses 
on NATO, providing a background on its origins and purposes. Chapters III and IV each 
examine one of NATO’s maritime operations: OAE and OOS, respectively. Each chapter 
will analyze the origins of the operation, any transformations during its activity, and the 
contributions of the participants with due attention to the activities of non-members. 
Chapter V, the conclusion, compares the findings about OAE and OOS and determines to 
what extent—and in what ways—the inclusion of non-member states in these NATO 
operations was advantageous. The conclusion focuses on lessons learned and makes 
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II. NATO’S CHANGING SECURITY ROLES AND 
COOPERATIVE PARTNERS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a multinational organization 
made up of 29 countries. To support unity in the alliance, NATO has a set of shared values 
that each member nation has agreed upon, including individual liberties, democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law. Generally, the Allies rely on democratic values but have 
the strength of military force, if necessary, to protect their freedom and safety. In order to 
do this, NATO undertakes a number of missions supported by its members for the benefit 
of one and all. At its outset, NATO was focused on the collective defense of its members 
as well as cultivating dialogue with possible enemies, and later added the goals of crisis 
management and cooperative security.13  
Isaac Kfir, Director, National Security Program, and Head, Counter-terrorism 
Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, has suggested that NATO is in a 
paradigm shift into its third distinct identity. Its first identity entailed its initial formation 
as a defensive security alliance. Second, it shifted following the Cold War by accepting 
additional responsibilities in peacekeeping and crisis management. Finally, according to 
Kfir, the post-11 September 2001 NATO, its current form, is struggling to settle on an 
identity.14 The Allies themselves hold that they are simultaneously pursuing three core 
tasks—collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Following their 
actions in Kosovo conflict in 1999 and more specifically following the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks, the NATO Allies have been shifting their attention toward the inclusion 
of non-members in their operations.15 This is especially important because, with the 
increase of non-traditional security threats, as with state actor threats, “NATO’s security 
                                                 
13 David S. Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 1. 
14 Kfir, “NATO’s Paradigm Shift,” 1. 
15 David S. Yost, “NATO’s Evolving Purposes and the next Strategic Concept,” International Affairs 
86, no. 2 (2010): 489. 
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may thus be affected by threats stemming from beyond the territory of its member states.”16 
NATO has employed several methods to counter such threats since its beginning. However, 
the range and extent of these threats may be changing.  
As noted earlier, some observers maintain that NATO is in a paradigm shift into its 
third distinct identity. It first entailed its formation as a defensive security alliance. Second, 
while remaining an alliance for collective defense, NATO began to undertake non-Article 
5 crisis management operations and cooperative security activities in 1991. These new core 
tasks, especially since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, have involved increased 
attention to the inclusion of non-member partners.17 This is especially important because 
of the increase in non-traditional security threats. Ioanna-Nikoletta Zyga, a Policy Advisor 
on Foreign and Security Policy at the European Parliament, notes four main ways that the 
threats to NATO have changed since the Cold War; they have become (a) “more pernicious 
and complex,” (b) “interconnected and mutually reinforcing,” and (c) “less predictable,” 
and (d) they “transcend geography” in relation to the Alliance’s traditional Article 6 
stipulations.18  
One way that NATO is countering non-traditional security threats is through its 
“global partners” initiative. “Global Partners” are countries outside NATO’s regional 
partnerships that wish to participate in NATO-led operations or cooperate in other ways. 
NATO’s website states that “the emergence of global threats requires the cooperation of a 
wider range of countries to successfully tackle challenges such as terrorism, proliferation, 
piracy or cyber attacks.”19 Improved relations with non-members through cooperative 
frameworks can be to the benefit of NATO, whether they be in the Mediterranean Dialogue, 
the Partnership for Peace, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, or the new Global Partners. 
                                                 
16 Ioanna-Nikoletta Zyga, “Emerging Security Challenges: A Glue for NATO and Partners?,” NATO 
Research Paper 85 (November 2012): 2. 
17 Yost, “NATO’s Evolving Purposes and the next Strategic Concept,” 489. 
18 Zyga, “Emerging Security Challenges,” 2. 




Improved relations with non-members through cooperative frameworks can be to the 
benefit of NATO allies, as outlined in NATO’s 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration: 
We remain committed to further developing political dialogue and practical 
cooperation with our partners. In doing so, we will carry forward the 
important achievements of NATO’s partnerships policy and continue to 
respect the specificity of our existing multilateral partnerships… NATO’s 
relationships with other partners across the globe are expanding and 
deepening, reflecting common goals in the area of security. NATO’s 
Partnership mechanisms have evolved substantially over the past 20 years 
and they, like NATO itself, would benefit from a focused reform effort to 
make our dialogue and cooperation more meaningful, and to enhance the 
strategic orientation of our cooperation through a better assessment of the 
cooperation activities conducted with partners.20  
As a result of the successful inclusion of non-members in its operations, NATO 
outlined its drive to include more partners in its 2010 Strategic Concept. Specifically, to 
“enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners 
together—across and beyond existing frameworks.”21 To date several operations have 
benefited from such participation, including the Implementation Force (IFOR) and 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), and 
Operation Ocean Shield (OOS).  
Having discussed the origins and purposes of NATO, this chapter will explore the 
transformations of NATO and analyze its current state. It will focus on NATO’s shift 
toward the inclusion of non-member states in its non-Article 5 operations. NATO was 
initially designed as an alliance based on pledges of collective defense. However, since its 
inception the global situation has changed quite drastically. With major changes in the 
geopolitical realm, NATO too has changed. This chapter examines how NATO has 
changed since 1949 along with the catalysts for its changes. Finally, this chapter analyzes 
                                                 
20 “Lisbon Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon,” NATO, November 20, 2010, paragraph 25–26, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68828.htm. 
21 Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 




NATO in its current form, with particular attention to non-member participation in NATO-
led operations, as well as what impact (if any) these non-members have had on NATO 
policy. This chapter hypothesizes that by providing assistance and benefit to NATO 
operations non-member participants are driving NATO to open its future non-Article 5 
operations to more contributors.  
B. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION: TRANSFORMATIONS  
NATO has employed several methods to counter threats from beyond the borders 
of the Allies, including by undertaking operations to directly counter those threats. David 
Yost states that “the allies have retained the traditional purposes of the alliance and have 
taken on additional roles.”22 Since the end of the Cold War the purposes have included 
security, consultation, deterrence and defense, crisis management, and partnership. The 
shift in recent times has steered the alliance to a more global focus. “This is not an alliance 
focused on Europe or the Euro-Atlantic area; nor is it a global alliance because it remains 
Atlantic and invokes global threats and issues in relation to its own security; it is rather an 
Atlantic Alliance focused on the globe.”23 Increasing the purview of the Alliance to a 
global scale involves the addition of new partners that may not share the same values as 
NATO.  
Following its actions in the Kosovo conflict and more specifically following the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO has been shifting its attention toward the inclusion 
of non-members in its operations.24 Specifically, the Alliance has included “Global 
Partners” from outside NATO’s regional partnership frameworks in order to counter these 
new or changing threats. Because these nations are not members of the alliance, they are 
not required to share the same values as the alliance; they simply share a desire to exchange 
views and contribute to a specific NATO activity. Magnus Petersson, an associate 
professor for defence and security policy at Stockholm and Oslo Universities, states that 
                                                 
22 Yost, “NATO’s Evolving Purposes and the next Strategic Concept.” 
23 Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning, “Introduction: Taking Stock of NATO’s New Strategic 
Concept,” in NATO’s New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment, ed. Jens Ringsmose and Sten 
Rynning, DIIS Report 2 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2011), 8. 
24 Yost, “NATO’s Evolving Purposes and the next Strategic Concept,” 489. 
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“NATO has conducted a number of ‘out of area’ operations after the Cold War… especially 
the operations in the former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan, to a large extent have shaped 
the development of NATO over the last 20 years.”25 In order to carry out these operations 
NATO has relied on a number of partnership programs to tailor participation of non-
members to their interests or regional concerns.  
C. NON-MEMBER PARTICIPATION 
According to Benjamin Schreer, when NATO began its enemy and its goals were 
clear: “to deter and, if necessary, to defeat an existential threat posed by forces of the 
Warsaw Pact. After the collapse of the former enemy, NATO adapted its strategic focus 
and became increasingly engaged in crisis management operations which, while certainly 
important, were not existential to its member states. Moreover, the alliance significantly 
expanded its membership from 16 at the end of the Cold War to 28 members in 2009.”26 
Since June 2017, NATO has had 29 members. The Alliance has an indefinite number of 
current or future partners for crisis management operations.  
Schreer has also observed that “the advent of crisis management operations beyond 
the Euro-Atlantic area has led many allies to carefully limit their contributions to these 
missions. In their view, even a failure of operations such as in Afghanistan will not mean 
the end of NATO as a military alliance.”27 This seems to be a reasonable assessment since 
none of these operations is geared against an existential threat to the Alliance, specifically 
one that could trigger an Article 5 response. As a result of the limited threat it is reasonable 
for some NATO members to decide that it is not in their best interest to become involved 
in these operations. However, non-Article 5 operations, such as ISAF, OAE, and OOS, 
offer excellent venues for non-members to participate and gain valuable insights into how 
                                                 
25 Magnus Petersson, “The Forgotten Dimension? NATO and the Security of the Member States,” in 
Pursuing Strategy: NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi, ed. Håkan Edstöm and Dennis 
Gyllensporre, New Security Challenges (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 126. 
26 Benjamin Schreer, “The Evolution of NATO’s Strategy in Afghanistan,” in Pursuing Strategy: 
NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi, ed. Håkan Edstöm and Dennis Gyllensporre, New 
Security Challenges (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 141. 
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NATO and its members operate. This experience could make it possible for these nations 
to cooperate more effectively with NATO, or each other, in the future.  
Launched in December 1994, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) represents 
NATO’s first partnership programme after the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and 
Partnership for Peace (PfP). When the MD was founded, it was specifically designed due 
to concerns over “security and stability” in the Mediterranean region.28 There are currently 
seven countries participating in the MD: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, 
Morocco, and Tunisia. Each primarily participates in a one-on-one relationship with NATO 
with the goal of stimulating “political dialogue and practical cooperation.”29  
Established in January 1994, the PfP was designed to increase individual country 
relations with NATO, allowing access to all aspects of the Alliance’s activity. Currently 
there are 21 countries participating. Altogether 34 countries have participated; 13 have 
joined NATO, and 3 are currently in a Membership Action Plan (MAP).30 Those countries 
formerly in the PfP and currently in NATO are: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia. Countries that are still in the PfP include: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, 
Malta, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. In 2011 the 
program was expanded to allow access to PfP activities and exercises by other partners 
with NATO as well.  
The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched in 2004, is specially geared 
toward countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).31 There are currently four 
countries participating in the ICI: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. 
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Oman and Saudi Arabia have been observers. The intent of the ICI is to focus on regional 
issues such as terrorism as well as weapons of mass destruction. As with the other 
geographical partnership frameworks, the ICI is intended to be a venue for dialogue and 
cooperation, specifically focusing on the concerns of the Alliance and its partners.  
Building on previous partnership programs, NATO launched an initiative that 
began in 1999 with its Membership Action Plan (MAP). Taking advantage of the lessons 
from the membership accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999, the 
Alliance via MAP helped Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia to join NATO in 2004. They were followed by Albania and Croatia in 2009 and 
by Montenegro in 2017.32 There are currently 2 countries with a MAP, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and FYROM. These countries are receiving tailored advice as they aspire to 
join NATO. However, not every country that participates in NATO-led operations can 
aspire (or has the desire) to join the alliance.  
Because not every country has the ability to join NATO, owing to geographical or 
political or other reasons, NATO began developing Individual Partnership Action Plans 
(IPAP) in 2002. Similar to the MAP in some ways, an IPAP allows for bilateral assistance 
focused on the individual partner country in one or more of six categories: “political and 
security issues; defence, security and military issues; public information; science and 
environment; civil emergency planning; and administrative, protective security and 
resource issues.”33 There are currently five countries with an IPAP: Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Georgia and Montenegro withdrew 
while pursuing full NATO Membership, which Montenegro attained in 2017.  
One of NATO’s most recent initiatives is its Partners Across the Globe. “Global 
Partners” are countries that fall outside NATO’s regional partnership frameworks but have 
a desire to participate in NATO-led operations and partnership activities.34 In the early 
                                                 
32 “Individual Partnership Action Plans,” NATO, June 9, 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_49290.htm. 
33 Ibid. 
34 NATO, “Relations with Partners across the Globe.” 
 
 16 
1990s, especially after the formation of the MD and PfP, it became apparent to NATO that 
the inclusion of partners from outside the Alliance could provide critical support to its 
operations. Steps taken at the 2006 Riga Summit and the 2008 Bucharest Summit finally 
resulted in a more clearly defined goal of global partners at the 2010 Lisbon summit.35 
There are currently nine countries that are included in NATO’s Global Partners initiative: 
Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and 
South Korea (ROK). Creating new partnerships and expanding the scope of existing 
relationships with partners have the potential to benefit NATO and its partners. 
Stephan Frühling, a lecturer in the Strategic Defence Studies Centre at the 
Australian National University, and Benjamin Scheer, the Deputy Director of the Aspen 
Institute Germany, suggest four steps for NATO to progress with partnerships. First, the 
Allies could pursue a more intense focus on European partners, specifically those in the 
EU that are not part of NATO. Second, the Allies could maintain relations with Russia, as 
well as bilateral and multilateral relations with countries on NATO’s eastern border. Third, 
Frühling and Schreer hold that the MD and the ICI should be clearer with their goals in 
order to manage expectations on both sides. Finally, Frühling and Schreer propose that 
NATO’s global partners include regional security organizations and not just countries.36 
NATO has certainly changed since the end of the Cold War. However, maintaining its 
status as a defensive alliance while building on vital partnerships has kept it relevant.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The Alliance is no longer just a Cold War defensive alliance, nor did it ever become 
simply a peacekeeping organization. This chapter shows that NATO is also engaged in 
partnership activities in support of cooperative security and crisis management. As stated 
previously, the 2010 Lisbon Summit acknowledged the successes of NATO’s partnerships, 
and the Allies revised NATO’s Strategic Concept to bolster relations with partners.37 
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Capitalizing on this shift, the call to increase partnership activities and operations derived 
in part from recent NATO-led operations such as ISAF and OOS. The integration of 
partners in these operations and others demonstrates the Alliance’s ability not only to work 
with partner forces but also to integrate them at the operational level as well. For some 
partner countries, this has involved little more than a few liaison missions concerning how 
to integrate their forces with NATO in the future, while for others it has meant thousands 
of troops, several ships, or financial support. Following its actions in the Kosovo conflict 
and more specifically following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO has been 
shifting its attention toward the inclusion of non-members in its operations.38 Recent 
operations have demonstrated steps forward in the development and the inclusion of 
partners, and have indicated a trend toward including these forces in earlier stages of 
planning and preparation than in the past.  
Since June 2017 NATO has had 29 members. The Allies were, at NATO’s 
founding, dedicated to collective defense. In more recent times, with the expansion of the 
Alliance, as well as the rise of global threats, the Allies have been able to work with a 
variable number of current or future partners in crisis management operations. As a result 
of limited the stakes in certain contingencies it is reasonable for some NATO members to 
decide that it is not in their interest to become involved in these operations. Some Allies 
chose, for example, not to take part in the 2011 intervention in Libya. However, operations 
such as ISAF, OAE, and OOS have offered excellent venues for non-members to 
participate and gain valuable insights into how NATO and its members operate. Such 
participation makes it possible for these nations to cooperate with NATO more successfully 
in similar or more complex operations and activities in the future. 
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III. NATO’S OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The NATO treaty is comprised of fourteen articles that each of the members has 
agreed to abide by. Article 5 is the keystone for the protection of NATO’s members. 
Specifically, that an attack on one of the members would be considered “an attack against 
them all.” The terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 prompted 
the NATO Allies to invoke their Article 5 obligations for the first and only time to date.  
Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) was one of NATO’s responses to the 11 
September terrorist attacks against the United States. Its primary objective was to prevent 
terrorist activity in the Mediterranean, and as such, it fell under Joint Force Command 
located in Naples, Italy.39 The Mediterranean is a critical area to protect due to the flow of 
merchant traffic through such a narrow area of water.40 In order to monitor and deter 
terrorism in the Mediterranean, OAE relied on the vast amount of merchant traffic to report 
suspicious activity, and naval assets for conducting presence and surveillance operations. 
The operation specifically targeted the movements of weapons associated with terrorism.  
In addition to the triumphs against terrorism, OAE was successful as a result of its 
geopolitical relationship-building between NATO members and non-NATO countries and 
organizations. This chapter explores that success by reflecting on the role of the individual 
participants in OAE. To do this, it examines the origin of OAE. Then, it evaluates the 
transformations that OAE underwent over 15 years. Finally, this chapter introduces the 
participants, reflecting on the importance that each played in OAE in order to determine 
whether their participation benefitted the operation.  
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B. OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR: ORIGINS 
Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September on the United States, at the request 
of the United States, NATO invoked Article 5 of its founding treaty. Article 5 calls for the 
collective defense of allies of the treaty, implying that an attack on one ally is an attack on 
all.41 As such, each member is asked to respond as it sees fit, individually or with the rest 
of NATO. To this day, this remains the only time that NATO has invoked the Article 5 
collective defense pledge; as a result of Article 5, NATO implemented eight measures. 
Those eight measures were stated by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, to the 
press: 
 enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation, both bilaterally and 
in the appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by 
terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;  
 provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according 
to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other states which are 
or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their 
support for the campaign against terrorism;  
 take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities 
of the United States and other Allies on their territory; 
 Backfill selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility that 
are required to directly support operations against terrorism;  
 provide blanket overflight clearance for the United States and other 
Allies’ aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic 
arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to 
operations against terrorism; 
 provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and 
airfields on the territory of NATO nations for operations against 
terrorism, including for refueling, in accordance with national 
procedures. 
The North Atlantic Council also agreed:  
                                                 




 that the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval 
Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO 
presence and demonstrate resolve; and  
 that the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO 
Airborne Early Warning force to support operations against 
terrorism.42 
The eight measures implemented by NATO paved the way for all future operations 
with allies and also with non-NATO entities. For the Allies, the measures directed 
assistance to those suffering terrorism as well as providing security for those fighting it. 
With applications to multiple operations, including OAE, the measures called for use of 
airspace, ports and airfields in the fight against terrorism. Finally, the Allies deployed the 
Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean, and this deployment within 20 days 
would come to be known as OAE. Since that time, with OAE’s success and persistence it 
became the longest lasting NATO naval operation.  
The mission of OAE was to deter, defend against, and disrupt terrorism to protect 
the shipping traffic in the Mediterranean through the use of NATO ships.43 The Standing 
Naval Forces in the Mediterranean were deployed on 6 October, 2001, and on 26 October, 
2001 the deployment officially became OAE.44 The primary contributors of forces initially 
were Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey because of their proximity to the Eastern 
Mediterranean, their membership in NATO, and their reliance on trade through the area.45 
To accomplish the tasks of OAE, NATO relied on the navies of its members as well as the 
dense merchant traffic in the area to patrol and report any suspicious activity. Once such 
activity was reported, the surface forces that carried out the mission of OAE were 
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responsible for “locating, tracking, reporting, and boarding selected vessels.”46 OAE was 
successful in completing its tasks as set out by NATO.  
OAE rallied together eleven NATO members (Denmark, Estonia, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the UK, and the United States), two 
countries from the Mediterranean Dialogue (Israel and Morocco), three countries from the 
Partnership for Peace (Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia), and New Zealand. These countries 
made it possible for OAE to, in the first three years, conduct surveillance on 41,000 vessels, 
board 47 vessels, and escort 414 ships through the Straits of Gibraltar (STROG);47 and by 
December 2008, to hail 100,000 merchants and board 148 of those.48 During the period 
from 2012 to 2016 the number of boardings was as follows: 1 in 2012, 1 in 2013, 5 in 2014, 
3 in 2015, and 1 in 2016. During the period from 2014 to 2016 the number of vessels hailed 
was as follows: 3,571 in 2014, 5,940 in 2015, and 3,135 in 2016.49 This demonstrates a 
continuing trend toward utilization of counter-terror surveillance networks rather than 
direct contact. Additionally, OAE provided assistance to countries in need despite not 
falling under the purview of the operation. In particular, OAE assisted the Greek law 
enforcement authorities with motor vessel Crystal in March 2006, a vessel which was 
carrying 126 potential illegal immigrants bound for Greece. Although migrant issues did 
not fall under the purview of the operation, the availability of a military vessel that was 
able to render aid proved vital for those onboard the Crystal.50 
OAE was not the only operation that was dedicated to defending against terrorism 
in the maritime environment. Adjacent to the Mediterranean is Operation Black Sea 
Harmony, another multinational operation. Initiated by Turkey, it has received support 
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from other littoral Black Sea states.51 However, efforts to extend OAE into the Black Sea 
were halted by Russia and Turkey because of the operation already taking place. South of 
the Suez Canal and shortly after the launch of OAE, Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 was 
reestablished to carry out a similar mission, encompassing the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, 
the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman.52 CTF 150 operates under Combined Maritime 
Forces (CMF), a naval partnership between 31 nations with five tasks: “defeating terrorism, 
preventing piracy, encouraging regional cooperation, and promoting a safe maritime 
environment.”53 These similar operations and OAE mutually benefitted from each other, 
by covering neighboring regions and by demonstrating their utility.  
C. OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR: TRANSFORMATIONS  
OAE was vital geographically because “90% of the world’s commerce is seaborne 
and 75% of that trade passes through a few, vulnerable, canals and international straits.”54 
At its inception, OAE sought to provide protection for one of those international straits—
the Suez Canal. Because of the location of the Suez Canal in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
its vital trade importance, and the proximity to the flow of terrorism there was a significant 
possibility of a terrorist attack in the area. In February 2003, OAE was expanded to include 
the STROG, to protect some 3,000 merchant ships that travel the straits daily.55 The 
primary purpose of the expansion was to provide safety for non-military vessels while 
transiting. Terrorist attacks in either the STROG or the Suez Canal area have the potential 
for significant global social, economic, and military impacts.  
In 2006 NATO expanded OAE politically, by inviting countries outside the NATO 
framework, to build an interoperable force by offering training for those willing. 
                                                 
51 “US Black Sea Strategy Emerges, But May Lack Pentagon Focus,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, February 
14, 2007, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1156345. 
52 Jason R. Haen, “Leveraging Global Maritime Partnerships to Increase Global Security in the 
Maritime Domain” (master’s thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, 2008), 31. 
53 “About CMF,” CMF, accessed March 14, 2017, https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/about/. 
54 NATO, “Alliance Maritime Strategy.” 




Specifically targeted were non-NATO countries willing to aid in the counter-terrorism 
efforts. By including these countries the Allies not only gained additional forces to share 
the burden of the mission but also to provide and share valuable intelligence data. As Bailey 
points out, “a war against terrorists, or against state regimes with actual or possible WMD 
[weapons of mass destruction] capabilities, relies heavily on precise intelligence, highly 
trained and professional personnel, advanced technology and modern, integrated 
platforms.”56 The process of receiving this aid from non-NATO countries began with an 
exchange of letters detailing their intent to join followed by a number of training evolutions 
to ensure proficiency. The training was gladly provided by NATO because the process 
ensured security throughout Europe and across the globe. As a result OAE was able to 
build geopolitical relationships, even outside NATO.  
In January 2010, OAE underwent another change, this time operationally, shifting 
“from a platform-based to a network-based operation” focusing on intelligence sharing 
between its participants.57 Due to budget restrictions and the geographical expansion of 
OAE, it became impossible to cover the entire maritime area with a naval force. As a result, 
the new OAE focused on building a network of nations, making the operation more cost-
effective. A result of the change was that the allies could rely less on having forces 
deployed in the Mediterranean. Therefore, OAE shifted to the use of surge forces that may 
have already been in the area for other purposes. Moreover, OAE headquarters shifted from 
Naples to Maritime Command Headquarters, Northwood, England, in February 2013.58 
Because it was now an intelligence operation there was no longer a need for a naval 
commander in the Mediterranean.  
Finally, NATO ended OAE in 2016 in order to strengthen relations with the EU 
through the sharing of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance air and naval assets.59 
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The end of OAE saw the beginning of Operation Sea Guardian (OSG), a similar operation 
with a greater scope and scale. Despite the change, the mission of OAE remained part of 
OSG’s mandate: to identify and disrupt terrorism operations in the Mediterranean. 
According to NATO’s website, “Sea Guardian is a flexible maritime operation that is able 
to perform the full range of maritime security tasks, if so decided by the North Atlantic 
Council. It is currently performing three tasks in the Mediterranean Sea: maritime 
situational awareness, counter-terrorism at sea and support to capacity-building.”60 
Because OAE had evolved to an intelligence-based operation, logic indicates it became an 
operation of greater scale. These intelligence-based actions were successful, as 
demonstrated by the number of participants that aided OAE. 
D. WHO’S WHO? 
Participating in OAE were NATO allies Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Turkey, the UK and the United States, all of which provide forces to Standing Naval 
Force Mediterranean on a rotating basis.61 Denmark, Germany, Norway and Spain donated 
forces specifically for STROG escorts.62 Estonia also participated in OAE by providing 
naval personnel. More significant, however, are the non-NATO contributors, including 
members of the Mediterranean Dialogue: Israel and Morocco. The Partnership for Peace 
contributors have included Georgia, Ukraine and Russia. Additionally, New Zealand 
provided a vessel in April - May 2015.63 Some countries that sought to aid in OAE were 
also aspiring to become NATO members, like Georgia and Ukraine, while some simply 
hoped to develop closer ties to NATO, like Russia. 
The Mediterranean Dialogue is a forum that was created in 1994 by NATO to 
reinforce “security and stability in the Mediterranean… It has deepened mutual 
understanding between NATO member counties and their Mediterranean partners.”64 
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Following an exchange of letters in 2006, Israel supported OAE by having a liaison 
stationed permanently at OAE headquarters in Naples. Israel did not provide any ships, 
despite numerous negotiations that occurred until May 2010, when Turkey vetoed Israel’s 
participation. Turkey’s actions were a result of the Gaza flotilla incident, in which Israeli 
naval commandos killed eight Turkish citizens while in combat.65 For Morocco, an 
exchange of letters occurred in 2008 concerning its intent to contribute to OAE. Like Israel, 
Morocco had not provided any ships to support OAE. However, Morocco hosted ships 
from the Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean in Casablanca, particularly in 2004, when 
four ships were in port.66 This type of evolution is vital because it results in a dialogue and 
continued mutual understanding between countries that at times have been antagonistic. 
As noted previously, participants in the Partnership for Peace also rendered aid to 
OAE. According to NATO’s website, the Partnership for Peace is intended to create an 
opportunity for individual countries to open a dialogue and engage in cooperation with 
NATO.67 The addition of Partnership for Peace nations to OAE was considered an 
achievement because of the interoperability and capability building with those nations.68 
Georgia, like Israel and Morocco, exchanged letters with NATO in 2008, established a 
Tactical Memorandum of understanding in 2010, and sent a liaison representative but did 
not provide any forces to OAE.69  
According to David S. Yost, “Ukraine has participated more extensively in NATO-
led operations than any other partner country.”70 One of the driving factors for Ukraine’s 
heavy involvement was to participate in international cooperation efforts to further the goal 
of European integration. Ukraine provided: The URS Ternopil from25 May to 2 July, 2007, 
the URS Lutsk from 24 November to 11 December, 2007, the URS Sagaidachnyi from 30 
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May to 2 August, 2008, the URS Ternopil for the second time from 18 November to 3 
December, 2008, the URS Ternopil for the third time from 22 October to 23 November, 
2009, and URS Ternopil for the fourth time from 10 November to 17 December, 2010.71  
Russia provided the RFS Pitliviy from 9 to 25 September, 2006, and also the RFS 
Ladny from 3 to 25 Septembe, 2007. Both of Russia’s deployments were short. However, 
the fact that they deployed for OAE at all indicated an improvement in NATO-Russia 
relations. However, Russia’s participation ended with the Georgia crisis.72 The inclusion 
of forces from countries outside NATO demonstrates OAE’s success in its goal to enhance 
cooperation. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Born out of NATO’s Article 5 response to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the 
United States, this protracted NATO mission could be called a success. Over its 15 years, 
OAE expanded its scope; first in its geographic coverage, reaching to the STROG and 
including the entire Mediterranean as a result; and second geopolitically, by accepting aid 
from countries outside NATO. These expansions showed a continued interest in using the 
maritime environment to fight terrorism, as well as interest in partnering with NATO. 
Altogether OAE rallied together eleven NATO members, two countries from the 
Mediterranean Dialogue, three countries from the Partnership for Peace, and New Zealand. 
This cooperation represents one of the closest and most successful interactions with 
countries outside the alliance for its time. Clear interest in continuing this type of operation 
is evident because one of the key components of OSG is continuing the mission of OAE.  
Despite the fact that OAE was only one of the eight measures in NATO’s response 
to 11 September, it was also successful in accomplishing three other missions as well. It 
did this by enhancing intelligence sharing and co-operation with countries willing to 
provide assistance; by aiding countries subjected to terrorism, severing links in the flow of 
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terrorist networks and providing assistance to countries in need with the forces at their 
disposal; and by the cooperation of the Allies and partner countries with an interest in the 
mission providing ports and airfields to support the shared objectives.  
Taking the maritime environment away from terrorists has proven to be a vital 
element in the fight against terrorism. However, the fight continues, and NATO is 
expanding to a more extensive range of operations; OSG will need to be NATO’s new 
instrument in the efforts. As new challenges emerge on the terrorism front, the example of 
the transformations that OAE underwent and its recent evolution to OSG can be used as a 
guide to effectively counter-terrorism not only in the Mediterranean but around the globe. 
OAE has demonstrated NATO’s ability to provide a venue for political dialogue and as 
well as a framework for increasing awareness of—and countering—emerging threats. 
Calling on the strength of its Allies as well as willing partners has granted NATO 
unparalleled experience in the field of counter-terrorism as well as cooperation, an 




IV. NATO’S OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD  
A. INTRODUCTION  
As a result of the successful inclusion of non-members in its operations NATO 
outlined its drive to include more partners in its 2010 Strategic Concept.73 To date several 
operations have benefited from such participation, including the Implementation Force 
(IFOR) and Stabilization Forces (SFOR) in Bosnia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the 
International Security Assistance Force, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), and 
Operation Ocean Shield (OOS). This chapter will focus on OOS, the most recent of these 
operations.  
OOS received the support of countries outside NATO’s regional partnership 
frameworks, including Australia, Colombia, Japan, and New Zealand. For seven years (17 
August, 2009—15 December, 2016) OOS was a NATO-led operation established to 
counter and deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off the Horn of Africa, and in the Indian 
Ocean.74 This chapter will discuss three major aspects of this operation. First, the chapter 
will clarify the origins of OOS and explain why the UN was calling for action against 
piracy in the region. Second, this chapter will analyze how the operation changed over the 
course of its seven years, shifting from an operation actively countering piracy to one that 
provided assistance to other countries developing their own counter-piracy capabilities.75 
Finally, this chapter will examine the participants in OOS, paying particular attention to 
states outside NATO and what they provided to the operation. This chapter proposes that, 
in addition to its triumphs against piracy, OOS succeeded in geopolitical relationship-
building between NATO members and non-NATO countries and organizations. Further, 
OOS represents a new trend for NATO’s inclusion of non-member states in its operations, 
and this chapter recommends their addition at the earliest possible stage.  
                                                 
73 NATO, “Lisbon Summit Declaration,” paragraph 25-26.  




B. OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD: ORIGINS 
Following in the footsteps of two previous NATO counter-piracy operations—
Operation Allied Provider (2008) and Operation Allied Protector (2009)—NATO 
established OOS in response to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 
calling for maritime counter-piracy action off the horn of Africa. Following UNSC 
Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, 1844, 1846, and 1851 (2008), NATO implemented 
Operation Allied Provider. It furnished naval escorts for World Food Programme vessels 
and deterred piracy by patrolling the waters near Somalia. From October to December 2008 
ships from three NATO members—Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom—carried out 
Operation Allied Provider.76 Later NATO began Operation Allied Protector to deter, 
defend against, and disrupt pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa, 
acting on previous UNSC resolutions. From March to August 2009, ships from nine NATO 
members—Canada, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States—carried out Operation Allied Protector.77 
The goal of OOS, unlike the two preceding missions, included the objective of 
integration of non-member states. According to Isaac Kfir, OOS was “designed to not only 
promote naval security but also forge ties with out-of-area states such as New Zealand, 
Australia and Japan.”78 It did so under the auspices of the previously listed United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and also UNSCRs 1897 (2009); 1918 and 1950 
(2010); 1976, 2015 and 2020 (2011). NATO partnered together with the European Union 
(EU)79 and the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces80 in Shared Awareness and 
Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings, allowing the organizations along with 30 states 
operating in the area to coordinate their efforts. These meetings involved Australia, 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Kfir, “NATO’s Paradigm Shift,” 235. 
79 EU Operation Atalanta began on December 8, 2008. “EU Naval Operation against Piracy 
(EUNAVFOR Somalia - Operation ATALANTA),” EU Council Secretariat, February 2010, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/csdp. 
80 Combined Task Force 151 was established in January 2009 “CTF 151: Counter-Piracy,” Combined 
Maritime Forces, September 16, 2017, https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/. 
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Bahrain, China, Egypt, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, 
Singapore, South Korea, Ukraine, and Yemen, among others.  
Rather than participating in the efforts organized by NATO, the EU, or the United 
States, some countries conducted national efforts. Instead of providing forces to one of the 
operations already in place, China, India, Iran, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the Gulf 
States, among others, sent their own forces to conduct counter-piracy operations.81 Some 
nations, including China, did not utilize the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor 
(IRTC), but instead established a route in the vicinity—China’s was just 5 nautical miles 
north of it—requiring at least some level of coordination with SHADE. Some other nations, 
particularly those that did not participate in the SHADE meetings, did not utilize a defined 
area of operations for their counter-piracy operations, specifically Iran. 
Due to the large amount of area to cover, about 2 million square miles, OOS 
required a significant naval presence; as a result, cooperation became a vital aspect of OOS. 
David Yost quotes Andrew Shapiro’s statement in 2011: “On any given day up to 30 
vessels from as many as 20 nations are engaged in counter-piracy operations in the 
region.”82 Those forces come from NATO, the EU, CTF-151, as well as national efforts. 
OOS, in particular, “has been conducted by three to six ships from the Standing NATO 
Maritime Groups, plus maritime patrol aircraft.”83 Together, NATO, the EU, and the 
United States Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) established a 480 nautical mile IRTC 
for shipping traffic to utilize while transiting the Gulf of Aden.84 There were, however, 
only two states from outside the Alliance that provided ships for the Standing NATO 
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Maritime Group85 for OOS, Ukraine and New Zealand. From the start of the operation, 
these forces conducted escorts as well as defended against pirate attacks. However, OOS 
was not a static operation. Because of the change in pirate activity it changed its goals over 
the course of its seven years of operation.  
C. OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD: TRANSFORMATIONS  
At its outset, NATO directed OOS to concentrate on counter-piracy efforts in the 
maritime environment. UNSCR 2020 in 2011 renewed previous resolutions calling for 
counter piracy operations off the Horn of Africa as follows: 
Renews its call upon States and regional organizations that have the capacity 
to do so, to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off 
the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and 
international law, by deploying naval vessels, arms and military aircraft and 
through seizures and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related 
equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off 
the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting such use.86  
Because of the success of the operation and because of the continued OOS presence 
in the area, piracy off the Horn of Africa declined. Following this decrease, and also due 
to changes in tactics by the pirates, the NATO allies transformed OOS, targeting logistics 
and support for piracy.87  
The first major transformation shifted OOS from aiding pirated ships and providing 
escorts to targeting logistics and support for the pirates. In order to do this NATO forces 
sought to disable pirate vessels and to attach tracking beacons to mother ships while 
                                                 
85 “SNMGs are multinational, integrated maritime forces made up of vessels from various Allied 
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86 “UNSC Resolution 2020,” United Nations Security Council, November 22, 2011, http://undocs.org/
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“allowing the use of force to disable or destroy suspected pirate or armed robber vessels.”88 
By doing this OOS was able to further reduce the amount of piracy in the area. (See Table 
1). Because of the trackers, the Allies were able to predict and prevent pirate attacks much 
more easily. Pervaiz Asghar, a Maritime Researcher at the National Centre for Maritime 
Policy Research in the National Defence College Islamabad, summarizes the changes in 
pirate activity: 
During the period 2005 to 2012, piracy off Somalia posed the predominant 
threat to world shipping. What started off as a local endeavor to curb the 
rampant poaching and dumping of toxic waste in lawless Somali waters 
grew into a fullblown piratical enterprise. Incidents of piracy rose seven fold 
to 35 in 2005, prior to declining briefly the next year, and then from 31 
pirate attacks in 2007, the problem literally exploded in 2008, when 
fabulous sums of money were raked in as ransom for captured vessels, cargo 
and crew. In 2010 alone, pirates seized close to 50 vessels, taking nearly 
1200 seamen as hostages. And from this peak, piracy dwindled gradually in 
2011 and more rapidly in the next year. In figurative terms, successful 
seizures went down from 49 in 2010 to 28 in 2011 and only 13 in 2012.89  
NATO noted in 2014 that, epitomizing this decrease, “since May 2012, not a single 
ship has been captured.”90 However, piracy is still a threat, as it could occur at any time. 
In fact, more recently, there appears to be a trend indicating that piracy may be back on the 
rise; although, “the number of pirate attacks in the past five years has been negligible.”91 
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Table 1.   Pirate Attacks 2008–2014 (as of October)92  
 
 
Due to the nature of piracy, an activity that virtually anyone could carry out, the 
second major change to OOS broadened its scope even further. This modification for OOS 
offered, “within means and capabilities to regional states that request it, assistance in 
developing their own capacity to combat piracy.”93 This addition to OOS allowed NATO 
to provide training and also coordinate efforts with the nations attending SHADE meetings. 
Doing so increased the counter-piracy effectiveness of the other countries and also helped 
to increase the ability of countries in the region to prevent piracy. Because of the lack of 
pirate activity and the bolstering of the ability of countries in the region to defend against 
it, NATO ended OOS in December 2016. In the words of the NATO website, “While the 
operation officially concludes today, NATO will continue to keep a close eye on the 
situation in the region and stands ready to restart our patrols should they be needed.”94 It 
is important that, though piracy may no longer be a major threat, NATO stands ready to 
respond in the event of a resurgence.  
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D. WHO’S WHO? 
NATO members that participated in OSS include Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The states 
that participated in OOS from outside NATO included Australia, Colombia, Japan, New 
Zealand, and Ukraine.95 Only two of these were integrated in the Standing NATO 
Maritime Group for deployments: New Zealand and Ukraine. Additionally, NATO units 
worked closely with other international operations that were occurring at the same time; 
the European Union was conducting Operation Atalanta, and the United States led 
Combined Task Force 151.  
Alessio Patalano, a Reader in War Studies in the Department of War Studies, 
King’s College London, specializing in Japanese naval history, analyses Japan’s 
contributions and determines that NATO is a “Natural Partner” for Japan. Patalano 
describes NATO’s relationship with Japan in three phases. First, during the Cold War both 
were concerned about the Soviet Union. Second, there followed a period of increasing 
political dialogue until the terrorist attacks on 11 September, 2001. Finally, they shifted to 
focus on global security issues; however, this interaction did not begin until 2009.96 Japan 
initially deployed two P-3C maritime patrol aircraft and two destroyers in July 2009 for 
OOS—but these assets were not integrated into the Standing NATO Maritime Group. From 
there Japan’s involvement increased, and “by 2014 Japanese air patrols covered 60 per cent 
of all surveillance flights in the Gulf of Aden.”97 Patalano notes the vital importance of not 
only maintaining, but also increasing relations between Japan and NATO, because “both 
actors need to face the possibility of having to deter both Russia and China from taking 
steps against the established maritime order.”98 Increasing activities in cooperation with 
Japan seems to be a wise decision for NATO; integrating forces for not only counter-piracy 
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operations but also for a number of other maritime purposes is beneficial, considering the 
uncertainties presented by Russia and China.  
Two other countries that provided forces to counter-piracy operations but did not 
integrate with NATO except for attending SHADE meetings were Russia and China. 
According to Patalano, “Until 2013, Russia too interacted with NATO naval forces for the 
benefit of the anti-piracy effort.”99 After 2013, Russia withdrew from NATO’s counter-
piracy as well as other efforts as the Russians turned their focus and became revanchist. 
China’s efforts against piracy began in December 2008 by deploying two warships, one 
support ship, and two helicopters.100 China’s continued attendance at SHADE meetings 
demonstrated its continued interest in cooperation with forces. According to Miwa Hirono, 
Associate Professor in Chinese studies at the College of International Relations, 
Ritsumeikan University, and Manshu Xu, Captain and Associate Professor at the Research 
Center for Crisis Management at the National Defence University in China, “Co-operation 
in counter-piracy operations can be further strengthened by, for example, the sharing of 
scarce force enablers, such as tankers and medical ships.”101 Improving the relationship 
between NATO and China may prove to be vital, and an important step for the future, 
especially when taking into account Russia’s decreased interest in co-operation with 
NATO.  
Two countries provided ships to the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) for 
deployments, New Zealand and Ukraine. From June until December 2013, Ukraine 
provided a frigate, UPS Hetman Sagaidachny to SNMG1 and from January until June 2014 
New Zealand provided a frigate, HMNZS Te Mana to SNMG2.102 These deployments 
represented continued interest and an improved level of integration for both countries 
because both participated in OAE but did not integrate into the SNMG structure at the time. 
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This integration of forces reflects a continued trend for NATO to increase its cooperation 
with non-members, specifically with Global Partner New Zealand.103 
Unfortunately, due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Alliance is likely to see a 
step backwards in the contributions from Ukraine to NATO-led operations in the future. 
Of the 21 countries in NATO’s Partnership for Peace, Ukraine is the only one to have 
integrated forces for OOS.104 Russia also provided forces but they were not integrated in 
the SNMG structure. NATO remains hopeful for a positive solution, as indicated by the 
trust funds established by NATO allies at the 2014 Wales summit to aid Ukraine in 
developing and sustaining its capabilities.105  
E. CONCLUSION 
As evidenced by the decrease in piracy activity and the Alliance’s ability to 
conclude OOS, this thesis considers OOS to have been a success. In Resolution 2020 in 
2011 the UNSC unanimously commended 
the efforts of the EU operation Atalanta, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
operations Allied Protector and Ocean Shield, Combined Maritime Forces’ 
Combined Task Force 151, and other States acting in a national capacity in 
cooperation with the TFG [Transitional Federal Government of Somalia] 
and each other, to suppress piracy and to protect vulnerable ships transiting 
through the waters off the coast of Somalia, and welcoming the efforts of 
individual countries, including China, India, Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, and 
Yemen, which have deployed ships and/or aircraft in the region.106 
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For NATO, along with the EU and CTF 151, to have the support of the UNSC 
indicates a positive result. NATO’s website quotes Alliance spokesperson Oana Lungescu 
as follows: “Operation Ocean Shield has been a great success—making an essential 
contribution to combatting piracy in the seas off Somalia and therefore keeping one of the 
world’s most important waterways safe and secure.”107 However, this thesis, after having 
analyzed the origins and transformations of OOS as well as the participants, concludes that 
it succeeded in geopolitical relationship-building between NATO members and non-
NATO countries as well.  
The support received by NATO from partners integrated well and benefited the 
operation. As evidenced by the establishment and success of SHADE, OOS signals a 
landmark in NATO’s transition to its new paradigm. The alliance is no longer just a Cold 
War defensive alliance, nor simply a peacekeeping organization. This thesis shows that 
NATO is also engaged in partnership activities in support of cooperative security and crisis 
management. The 2010 Lisbon Summit acknowledged the success of OOS by revising 
NATO’s Strategic Concept to bolster relations with partners: 
We remain committed to further developing political dialogue and practical 
cooperation with our partners. In doing so, we will carry forward the 
important achievements of NATO’s partnerships policy and continue to 
respect the specificity of our existing multilateral partnerships… NATO’s 
relationships with other partners across the globe are expanding and 
deepening, reflecting common goals in the area of security. NATO’s 
Partnership mechanisms have evolved substantially over the past 20 years 
and they, like NATO itself, would benefit from a focused reform effort to 
make our dialogue and cooperation more meaningful, and to enhance the 
strategic orientation of our cooperation through a better assessment of the 
cooperation activities conducted with partners.108 
Capitalizing on this shift, the call to increase partnership activities and operations 
was immediately applied to OOS, demonstrating the Alliance’s ability not only to work 
with partner forces—in particular Ukraine and New Zealand—but also to integrate them 
into SNMG deployments. Following its actions in the Kosovo conflict and more 
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specifically following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO has been shifting its 
attention toward the inclusion of non-members in its operations.109 OOS demonstrated a 
step forward in the development and the inclusion of partners and indicated a trend toward 
including these forces in earlier stages of planning and operations than in the past.  
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V. CONCLUSION  
Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, NATO 
launched its first maritime Article 5 operation, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE). The 
goal of this operation was to help deter, disrupt, and defend against terrorist activity. OAE 
began on 4 October 2001 and was the first NATO maritime operation to include non-
member participation, following in the footsteps of noteworthy operations before it—the 
Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, and the Kosovo 
Force (KFOR). The second maritime operation to include non-members, Operation Ocean 
Shield (OOS), was established in 2009 to deter and disrupt piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off 
the Horn of Africa, and in the Indian Ocean. This operation represented a continuing trend 
for NATO to not only include non-member participants, but to include them at an earlier 
point and to integrate them completely into the force.  
The inclusion of non-members in NATO maritime operations could lead to two 
basic outcomes. The first possibility is that of resounding success, in that non-members 
might integrate fully, and their support could be vital to the success of the operation. The 
second possibility is that the inclusion of non-members could be detrimental to the 
operation and it might flounder as a result. Intermediate possibilities are also conceivable. 
For example, the participation of some non-members might have been of minimal 
importance with little effect on the success or failure of the operation. This thesis 
investigated to what extent the inclusion of non-members contributed to the success of 
OAE and OOS. Further, it suggested that the implications of their inclusion should be 
considered by NATO planners at the earliest possible opportunity.  
This thesis examined to what extent Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) enhanced 
intelligence sharing and co-operation with countries willing to provide assistance. It 
determined that intelligence sharing and cooperation may have enabled these countries to 
sever links in the flow of terrorists and illicit supporting networks of traffickers, and may 
have provided assistance to countries in need with the forces at OAE’s disposal. In addition 
to reducing terrorist activity throughout the Mediterranean, OAE succeeded in geopolitical 
relationship-building between NATO members and non-NATO countries and 
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organizations. OAE marked the first NATO maritime operation to include non-member 
participation.  
This thesis also investigated to what extent the inclusion of non-members in OOS 
was advantageous for mission accomplishment. It determined that in addition to reducing 
piracy activity in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, OOS was (like OAE) successful in 
geopolitical relationship-building between NATO members and non-NATO countries and 
organizations. This operation specifically benefited from the inclusion of non-members 
during the planning phases. Going beyond OAE, OOS incorporated those non-NATO 
forces into a Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG), a first in NATO history. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
Despite the efforts of the United States, its allies, and security partners to curb 
terrorism and piracy, both dangers remain. NATO has played a major role in counter-terror 
and counter-piracy operations in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Contributions to 
these NATO-led operations by non-NATO states reinforced OAE for 15 years (2001-2016) 
and OOS for 7 years (2009-2016).  
Through OAE NATO paved the way for cooperation of maritime forces in an 
international framework by creating partnerships with non-members. This is due in part to 
the possible global impact of terrorism. As a result, NATO was able to draw on the support 
not only of its members but also of partner countries that have a common interest in 
countering these threats. OOS followed a similar pattern. Although initially established as 
a NATO operation, it too increased its capacity by allowing non-members to participate 
because of the global concern over piracy in the region and the possibility that it—like 
terrorism—could spread.  
As a result of the successful inclusion of non-members in its operations NATO 
outlined its drive to include more partners in its 2010 Strategic Concept. Specifically, the 
Allies pledged to “enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and 
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partners together—across and beyond existing frameworks.”110 To date several operations 
have benefited from such participation, including IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, KFOR in 
Kosovo, the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, OAE, and 
OOS to name a few.  
OAE was one of NATO’s responses to the 11 September terrorist attacks against 
the United States. Its primary objective was to prevent terrorist activity in the 
Mediterranean, and as such, it fell under Joint Force Command located in Naples, Italy.111 
The Mediterranean is a critical area to protect due to the immense flow of merchant traffic 
through such a narrow area of water.112 In order to monitor activities and deter terrorism 
in the Mediterranean, OAE relied on the vast amount of merchant traffic to report 
suspicious activity, and OAE employed naval assets to conduct presence and surveillance 
operations. OAE specifically targeted the movements of weapons associated with 
terrorism.  
Over its 15 years, OAE expanded its scope; first in its geographic coverage, 
reaching to the Strait of Gibraltar (STROG) and including the entire Mediterranean as a 
result; and second geopolitically, by accepting aid from partner countries outside NATO. 
These expansions show a continued interest in using the maritime environment to fight 
terrorism, as well as an interest in benefiting from the contributions of non-members 
partnering with NATO. Altogether OAE rallied together eleven NATO members, two 
countries from the Mediterranean Dialogue, three countries from the Partnership for Peace, 
and New Zealand.113 This cooperation represents some of the closest and most successful 
ties with partner countries outside the Alliance. Clear interest in continuing this type of 
operation is evident because one of the key purposes of Operation Sea Guardian—the 
operation taking OAE’s place—is continuing the OAE mission.  
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Despite the fact that OAE was only one of the eight measures in NATO’s response 
to 9/11, it was also successful in meeting three other tasks as well: (a) enhancing 
intelligence sharing and co-operation with countries willing to provide assistance; (b) 
aiding countries subjected to terrorism by severing links in the terrorist and trafficking 
networks and providing assistance to countries in need; and (c) promoting cooperation by 
NATO Allies and partner countries with an interest in the mission and a willingness to 
provide ports, airfields, ships, aircraft, and other assets.  
Taking the maritime environment away from terrorists may prove to be a vital 
element in the fight against terrorism. However, the fight continues and NATO is 
expanding to a more extensive field of operations against terrorism, piracy, and other 
crimes. OSG will become one of NATO’s new instruments in the efforts. As new 
challenges emerge on the terrorism front, the example of the transformations OAE 
underwent and its recent evolution to OSG can be used as a guide to effectively counter-
terrorism not only in the Mediterranean but around the globe.  
Following in the footsteps of two previous NATO counter-piracy operations—
Operation Allied Provider (2008) and Operation Allied Protector (2009)—NATO 
established OOS on 17 August 2009 in response to United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) Resolutions calling for maritime counter-piracy action off the horn of Africa. 
Following UNSC Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846 
(2008), and 1851 (2008), NATO implemented Operation Allied Provider. It furnished 
naval escorts for World Food Program vessels and deterred piracy by patrolling the waters 
near Somalia. From October to December 2008 ships from three NATO members—
Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom—carried out Operation Allied Provider.114 From 
March to August 2009 NATO conducted Operation Allied Protector to deter, defend 
against, and disrupt pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa, acting 
on previous UNSC resolutions. Ships from nine NATO members—Canada, Greece, Italy, 
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Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States—
carried out Operation Allied Protector.115 
OOS, unlike the two preceding missions, included the participation of non-member 
states. According to Isaac Kfir of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, OOS was 
“designed to not only promote naval security but also forge ties with out-of-area states such 
as New Zealand, Australia and Japan.”116 OOS did so under the auspices of the previously 
listed United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and also UNSCRs 1897 
(2009); 1918 (2010) and 1950 (2010); 1976 (2011), 2015 (2011) and 2020 (2011). NATO 
partnered together with the European Union (EU)117 and the U.S.-led Combined Maritime 
Forces118 in Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings, allowing these 
organizations and 30 states operating in the area to coordinate their efforts. These meetings 
involved Australia, Bahrain, China, Egypt, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Seychelles, Singapore, South Korea, Ukraine, and Yemen, among others.119 
Capitalizing on NATO’s shift toward including partners, the call to increase 
partnership activities and operations was immediately applied to OOS, demonstrating the 
Alliance’s ability not only to work with partner forces—in particular Ukraine and New 
Zealand—but also to integrate them into SNMG deployments. Following its actions in the 
Kosovo conflict and more specifically following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, 
NATO has been shifting its attention toward the inclusion of non-members in its 
operations.120 OOS demonstrated a step forward in the inclusion of partners and indicated 
a trend toward including these forces in earlier stages of planning and action than in the 
past.  
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Since June 2017 NATO has had 29 members. The Allies were, at NATO’s founding 
in 1949, dedicated to collective defense. Since the 1990s, with the expansion of the 
Alliance, as well as the rise of global threats, the Allies have been able to work with a 
variable number of current or future partners in cooperative security activities and crisis 
management operations. As a result of the limited stakes in certain contingencies (notably 
non-Article 5 cases), it is reasonable for some NATO members to decide that it is not in 
their interest to become involved in these operations. Some Allies chose, for example, not 
to take part in the 2011 intervention in Libya. However, operations such as ISAF, OAE, 
and OOS have offered excellent venues for non-members to participate in support of 
international security and gain valuable insights into how NATO and its members operate. 
Such participation makes it possible for these nations to cooperate with NATO more 
successfully in similar or more complex operations and activities in the future.  
Integrating forces is beneficial not only for counter-terror or counter-piracy 
operations but also for a number of other maritime purposes. This is of particular 
importance given today’s situation with the uncertainties presented by Russia, China and 
other potential adversaries. Geoffrey Till, a British naval historian and Professor of 
Maritime Studies in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London, states that 
“NATO provides the most sophisticated examples of maritime coalition operations with 
standing forces such as those in the Atlantic and Mediterranean… highlighting force unity 
and developing friendships between ships and bonds between nations.”121 Integrating the 
forces of Allies and partners under NATO auspices presents an early and often valuable 
opportunity for forces to practice together. This allows them to learn how Allies and 
partners operate, and this in turn enables them to conduct joint operations more smoothly 
and effectively in the future. 
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